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The	Irish	border	is	not	a	technical	issue	but	a
political	one
At	this	stage	of	the	exit	negotiations,	the	border	between	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Republic	is	not	a
technical	issue	but	a	political	one,	argues	Katy	Hayward	(Queen’s	University	Belfast).	She
explains	exactly	why	the	Northern	Irish/Irish	issue	is	a	block	preventing	the	Brexit	talks	from
progressing,	and	provides	suggestions	on	how	to	shift	it.
It	is	quite	clear	from	communications	from	the	EU	this	past	week	that	there	has	been	insufficient
agreement	across	all	three	of	the	priority	issues	(citizens’	rights,	financial	liabilities,	Northern	Ireland/Ireland)	for
the	Brexit	negotiations	to	move	into	the	next	phase	of	talks.	Of	these	three	areas,	the	one	centring	on	the	Irish
border	appears	to	be	particularly	complex	and	thorny.	In	order	to	assess	the	prospects	for	(and	means	of)
progression	on	this	matter,	it	is	important	to	acknowledge	what	has	already	been	achieved.
First,	we	should	not	underestimate	how	significant	it	is	that	the	EU	and	UK	government	share	several	core
principles	when	it	comes	to	Northern	Ireland/Ireland	issues.	They	are	agreed	on	the	need	to	protect	the	peace
process,	to	uphold	the	1998	Good	Friday	(Belfast)	Agreement	‘in	all	its	parts’,	and	to	avoid	a	hard	border	across
the	island.	Although	each	side	may	interpret	these	aims	differently,	the	fact	we	have	the	same	language	being
used	is	a	strong	starting	point	for	negotiation.
Added	to	this,	we	also	seem	to	have	had	significant	progress	on	the	preservation	of	the	Common	Travel	Area.
Agreement	on	the	Common	Travel	Area	means	that	there	will	be	no	new	immigration	controls	for	British	and	Irish
citizens	moving	between	these	islands.	It	also	allows	for	necessary	bilateral	cooperation	between	Ireland	and	the
UK	on	these	matters.	Although	not	comprehensive	(the	question	as	to	what	rights	these	citizens	will	enjoy	in	the
different	jurisdictions	is	still	to	be	decided),	it	is	welcome	progerss.
CC0	Creative	Commons
Now	to	the	topic	that	appears	to	be	growing	as	an	obstacle	to	progress:	the	Irish	border.	The	UK	government
believes	it	quite	impossible	to	offer	further	detail	on	the	subject	until	the	future	customs	relationship	is	clear;	it
sees	the	EU’s	intransigence	as	mere	game-playing.	For	its	part,	the	EU	believes	that	it	has	already	made	a
significant	concession	in	being	willing	to	allow	a	‘flexible’	solution	for	a	region	that	will	be	outside	the	EU;	it	is
waiting	for	the	UK	to	reciprocate	with	a	flexibility	of	its	own.
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There	is	a	logic	to	both	positions;	the	reason	they	are	failing	to	meet	in	the	middle	is	that	they	are	coming	from
fundamentally	different	interpretations	of	two	core	elements	in	those	shared	principles.	First,	the	meaning	of	a
‘hard	border’	and,	secondly,	what	is	needed	to	‘uphold’	the	Good	Friday	Agreement.
To	take	the	matter	of	a	‘hard	border’	first.	The	logic	of	the	EU’s	Single	Market	and	Customs	Union	has	been	to
create	frictionless	and	seamless	borders;	it	is	the	common	rules	and	standards	(and	the	means	of	enforcing
these)	that	have	removed	the	need	for	border	checks	on	goods.
Despite	propositions	for	a	‘customs	partnership’	or	‘streamlined	customs	arrangements’,	the	Prime	Minister
explicitly	stated	in	her	Florence	speech	that	the	EU	and	UK	will	have	different	economic	goals,	achieved	through
different	means.	She	also	said,	“when	we	differ	from	the	EU	in	our	regulatory	choices	it	will	be	because	we	want
rules	that	are	right	for	Britain’s	particular	situation.”	Not	‘if’	but	‘when’.
If	Northern	Ireland	is	wholly	part	of	the	UK’s	economic	choices	there	has	to	be	a
hard	border	across	the	island	of	Ireland
If	Northern	Ireland	is	wholly	part	of	the	UK’s	different	economic	goals,	means	and	regulatory	choices,	there	has	to
be	a	hard	border	across	the	island	of	Ireland	as	a	means	of	protecting	the	integrity	of	the	EU’s	internal	market.
The	only	way	of	avoiding	such	a	hard	border	is	to	allow	for	rules	(and	their	enforcement)	in	NI	that	continue	to
match	those	operating	in	the	EU.
This	does	not	automatically	mean	a	block	to	goods	moving	from	NI	into	the	rest	of	the	UK,	nor	does	it	mean	the
imposition	of	barriers	to	all	goods	coming	from	GB	into	NI.	The	details	as	to	which	goods	this	would	apply	to	(and
how)	can	be	worked	out	in	Phase	II	of	the	talks,	Barnier	has	conceded	this.	Instead,	what	is	sought	from	the	UK
government	is	acknowledgement	in	principle	of	the	need	for	(limited,	specific)	flexibility	in	the	treatment	of	NI.
Such	flexibility	can	be	seen	as	correlated	with	the	means	of	moving	the	second	blocking	point,	that	of
interpretation	of	the	1998	Agreement.	The	EU’s	guiding	principles	on	Ireland/Northern	Ireland	published	in
September	states:
“A	thorough	understanding	of	the	other	issues	beyond	customs	arrangements	which	are	relevant	to
the	border	is	also	required	in	order	to	move	forward”.
The	EU	is	looking	for	the	UK	to	directly	address	the	political,	security,	and	societal	dimensions	of	the	post-
withdrawal	arrangements	for	NI.
There	are	resonances	here	of	the	standoff	between	the	UK	and	the	rest	of	the	EEC	regarding	the	Haagerup
Report	of	1984,	in	which	the	European	Parliament	made	its	first	venture	into	addressing	the	conflict	in	Northern
Ireland.	The	British	government	loudly	protested	such	external	‘interference’	in	what	it	considered	to	be	a
‘domestic’	matter.	However,	within	a	short	time,	it	too	was	recognising	the	necessity	of	an	‘Irish	dimension’	in	any
‘solution’	to	the	conflict;	the	Anglo-Irish	Agreement	of	1985	encapsulated	such	an	approach,	much	to	the	anger	of
Unionists	at	the	time.
The	EU	wants	the	UK	to	directly	address	the	post-withdrawal	arrangements	for
NI
Unionists	have	been	much	happier	with	the	1998	Agreement	and	its	successors.	The	1998	Agreement	formally
recognises	the	strands	of	relationships	–	Nationalist/Unionist,	north/south,	British/Irish	–	that	together	determine
the	stability	and	peace	of	the	region.	It	is	with	this	in	mind	that	the	Agreement	should	be	centre	stage	of	the	next
steps	in	moving	the	Northern	Ireland/Ireland	issue	on	in	the	Brexit	negotiations.
The	longer	this	issue	remains	a	block	on	talks,	the	deeper	the	uncertainty	among	peoples	most	directly	affected
by	any	change	to	the	UK/EU	relationship.	The	UK	government	has	an	incredible	responsibility	here,	and	the
economic	and	political	future	of	Northern	Ireland	depends	on	how	it	is	exercised.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
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Dr	Katy	Hayward	is	Reader	in	Sociology	&	Senior	Research	Fellow,	Senator	George	J.	Mitchell	Institute	for
Global	Peace,	Security	and	Justice	at	Queen’s	University	Belfast.
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